Introduction
Tandis que de nouvelles formes de restructuration apparaissent dans l’entreprise, nous devons répondre à la question : " Qu’est ce que, ou qui est l’employeur ? "
La question est difficile mais déjà une première ligne se dessine. Ce qui est apparu clairement dans nos discussions est la chose suivante : plus on restructure, plus il est difficile d’identifier l’employeur.
Cependant, il reste essentiel de savoir qui dirige l’entreprise, puisque cette identification portent deux conséquences fondamentales :
- l’employé peut être engagé par le processus de restructuration
- Il peut aussi, éventuellement, contribuer à limiter le pouvoir de l’employeur.
Deux types de rationalités sont dès lors mobilisées dans ce contexte précis : en cas de restructuration, on s’aperçoit rapidement que l’employeur poursuit des buts économiques alors que la protection des salariés nécessite de lui voir appliquer des éléments légaux construits de rationalité sociale.
Ce 4e groupe a été, en conséquence, confronté à un problème de délimitation du sujet. En effet, il ne nous est pas apparu évident que les enjeux liés aux restructurations ainsi qu’aux transferts d’entreprise aident à mieux définir l’employeur aujourd’hui, et ce, spécialement au regard du droit français.
Cependant, il nous est apparu que, confrontés aux éventuelles limitations de son pouvoir, l’employeur pouvait être appréhendé de différentes manières par les systèmes nationaux :
C’est donc en fonction des obstacles qu’il rencontre que nous avons tenté de définir la figure du nouvel employeur en Europe.
A cette fin, trois problématiques ont été envisagées par le groupe :
The importance of the Employer in restructuring
All the Member States are pooled by the lack of a legal definition of employer and of remark on this argument.
Like the British model, the French definition of the employer has always been based on the contractual relationship. Even though, there is a critical discussion within the French doctrine in terms of contract and power. Although, in France power is built upon the contract. As a consequence the employer and the enterprise are linked. This is seen in the French law relating to transfer of undertaking (transfert d’entreprise) where in 1990 the French labour law system abandoned the legal link between the old and new employer in restructuring. Instead it now deals with the autonomous economic activity transferred, partially following the decisions of the ECJ and the 1998 Directive.
However, this change does not help to redefine the employer. Whereas the definition provided for in the French labour code (L. 122.12) describes all the types of economic operation which can lead to a juridical transfer. This may assist in the future when seeking to define the employer because the list of factors is not exhaustive. Thus, allowing new economic operations. Due to this framework, changes in French restructuring may be managed more effectively in the future, as law and economic are working together to protect the employee.
The UK system establishes a definition of worker (s. 230 Employment Rights Act 1996), but fails to define the employer. As a result, the British model of employer is determined by the contractual relationship of the employment situation, as governed by the Proof of Employment Directive (s. 1 Employment Rights Act 1996). Although, like in the Italian system, in restructuring UK labour law redefines the employment relationship in terms of ownership (see TUPE Regulations 1981). Such a legal situation reaffirms the employer’s power in the British employment relationship which in effect highlights that British employers control the restructuring process. For example, the law relating to transfer of undertaking is now based on an economic entity test, which provides the employer with greater flexibility.
Italian law does not have a definition of employer, but it seems that "owner of the firm" and "employer" are used as synonyms, as the articles of the Civil Code concerning the Labour contract (2094 ss.) mention the "entrepreneur" referring to one of the parts of the employment relationship. This synonymity featured the very simple economical system that characterised the industrial landscape in the 1940s.
Throughout the years, Italian lawyers have faced a mutation of the structure of the enterprise, leading to the income of plenty economical entities into a unique productive system. For example, in the Italian experience it had been the case of subcontracting (recently disciplined by a statute), franchising and auditing.
The consequence of this change has been the standout of many entrepreneurs inside the same productive organization, so the compresence of many employers. Nevertheless, the figure of the entrepreneur remained the same and so happened to the figure of the employer which is still underpinned by the concept of subordination, that refers to the inserting of the employee’s activity inside the firm and the respect of the command of the employer.
In the case of restructuring the economical decisions are taken by the owner of the firm, whereas the liability of the consequences on the labour relationships concern the employer. This distinction stands out also from the combination of the subcontracting and transfer of undertaking legal disciplines (art. 2112 c.c., art. 47 L. 428/90, L. 192/98), where are used terms such as "undertaking"/"enterprise" and "entrepreneur".
The traditional bilateral employment relationship exists also in Spain. Spanish labour law adopts an organisational approach to restructuring in the sense of transfer of undertakings. Moreover, Spanish law does not recognise a transfer of undertaking in the first generation of subcontracting. Whereas, this is not the case in English, French and Italian law, nor is it for second and beyond restructuring exercises in Spain itself. Consequently, it shows that the Spanish notion of employer leads to less protection for the employees subject to restructuring in first generation exercises.
The German labour system does not differ too much in describing the employer as one person - not only a company, but also a private individual or a public authority - who takes on another person. However, German Labour law is largely based on the concept of the commercial establishment. This means that the establishment is an organizational unit in which the entrepreneur pursues certain working objectives with his staff.
Transition
En ce qui concerne ce premier point, la comparaison menée conduit à une première conclusion. Si l’on considère une éventuelle réception de la rationalité économique au sein du système juridique, on est tenté de raisonner en termes de contrat, comme le montrent les systèmes anglais et français. En effet, ces deux systèmes semblent plus ouverts à l’avenir et aux futurs changements du concept d’employeur, bien que l’un se dirige plutôt vers une protection renforcée des salariés et que l’autre n’en apprécie pas la nécessité.
Cette différence doit nous conduire à envisager le pouvoirs de l’employeur au regard de la résistance du contrat de travail et, plus loin, à nous interroger sur une éventuelle limitation de ses pouvoirs par les conséquences attachées aux conséquences du contrat.
Employers’ rights on restructuring
In the French system, power of the employer is not limited by the contract, if the judge does not restrict the employer’s conduct. But still the power of the judge is based upon the existence of the contract. For examples, the employer must justify his decision to dismiss by explaining his reasons for modifying the contract and the existence of economic or technological problems. Hence, the jurisprudence surrounding these reasons has been extended. For instance in 1995 the Cour de Cassation has decided (arrêt Videocolor) that one of the reasons to dismiss can be based on the necessity to be competitive in a certain sector of activity. According to this decision, the contract as protected by the judge does not really restrict the employers’ power. However, it does also impose on the employer obligations to justify any economic dismissals and to provide some retraining for those employees who are dismissed.
Three reasons are given under British law for economic restructuring: redundancy, transfer of undertaking, and insolvency. Each of these reasons has its own, separate legal rules to govern these situations. But in each case the employer must give notice of these proceedings to his workers which lead to dismissal. Consequently, the employee is dismissed under notice unless he claims unfair dismissal in which circumstances he has to prove his case before an employment tribunal. Again, like the French system this juridical institution can control the power of the employer, but the UK’s approach is founded on discretion. However, the peculiar situation of transfers of undertaking allows for ‘economic, technical and organisational’ dismissals to take place rather than modifications to contractual terms which might protect employees’ jobs (see the Wilson case and Regulation 8, TUPE Regulations 1981).
The Italian system is based upon the Constitutional principle of the "free economical initiative" (art. 41 Cost.) which allows the entrepreneur to decide how to organise his own business, only with regard to the social rights of the workers. This means that it is possible for the Court never to blame the organisational choices, but to verify the link between those choices and the mean (i.e. a collective dismissal). Italian law provides for a technical reason for dismissal too. In situations where no such technical reason applies, companies with more than fifteen employees will be forced by an injunction to reintegrate the workers subjected to the restructuring. Whereas, those Italian enterprises with less than fifteen workers have to decide either to take the employee back under a new contract, or to pay damages in order to end the contract.
Before 1994 there were no quantitative elements to justify collective dismissals in Spanish law. Case law simply developed on a case-by-case approach. However, in 1994 the Spanish Parliament has provided justifications for dismissals, which a 1997 collective agreement concluded by the Spanish social partners specified as ‘economic, technical, organisational and productive’ reasons, as a consequence of restructuring. As a result, case law is now restricted.
In particular, the economic reason was based upon prevailing financial problems. The remaining technical, organisational and productive reason deals with employment security from a market perspective. Yet the Spanish employer must seek the authorisation of the labour administration for dismissals, which is controlled by the Regional Government. Where no authorisation is given, the employer can face an injunction and as a consequence has to decide whether to revoke the dismissal or to pay-off the workers with three times their redundancy entitlement. Spanish judges also have the right to alter the choice of the employer in relation to the number of workers to be dismissed by way of economic justification.
Under German law instead no justification is required for economic dismissals at the level of the undertaking. However, the German labour courts can prevent some economic dismissals where they have not followed the correct procedure.
Transition
A nouveau, on aperçoit qu’une conception économique de la rationalité juridique unit les systèmes français et anglais, qui semblent avoir anticipé, dans une certaine mesure, les prochaines formes de restructuration. Le caractère substantiel des droits allemand, italien et espagnol, rendent le système juridique plus fermé aux conséquences de l’évolution du marché.
Cependant, en termes de pouvoir et de recherche d’une définition adéquate du bon employeur, dont les décisions sont justifiées, il vaut mieux raisonner en termes de sanctions du licenciement plutôt qu’en termes de prévision des changements dans la structure de l’entreprise.
Ainsi, on peut dire que chaque système construit sa rationalité en fonction de la justification, juste milieu entre l’économie et le droit, la mieux appropriée aux réalités sociales du pays.
Ces justifications sont elles mobilisées de la même manière lorsqu’il s’agit de limiter les pouvoirs de l’employeur par ceux reconnus aux salariés ?
Employee involvement in restructuring
The French model of collective labour law requires that the works council (comité d’entreprise) should be consulted at each appropriate level (i.e. establishment and enterprise levels) when restructuring occurs. Such collective arrangements have ended the need in France for administrative authorisation. Again such changes have occurred due to French judicial pressure. For instance, since the decision (La Samaritaine) of 1997 the dismissal can be annulled by a French judge if the employer does not follow collective consultation and bargaining processes. The force of the collective limitation can also be seen during social plan discussions. This results in a negotiation between the employer and the trade unions instead of employer unilateral decision-making. Furthermore, in 1998 the Cour de Cassation has imposed a requirement that negotiation shall be preceded by the consultation with the works council. Hence, this demonstrates that economic dismissals are controlled by a collective process and that the French system acknowledges that economic situations can be subjected to constant change.
Recent changes in the UK under the 1999 Employment Relations Act revitalises trade union recognition for bargaining purposes. For instance, in the event of restructuring the employer must, subject to both the 1999 Consultation Regulations, inform his employees in ‘good time’ and ‘with a view to agreement’ on the social, economic and legal implications. Although in the past, UK employers have either consulted their employees on an individual basis or having elected employee representatives for these restructuring purposes, in future they may have to consult with recognised trade unions. This new collective dimension will reinforce employee involvement in restructuring.
In the Italian labour law system, there is an obligation to formally negotiate, but not necessarily to conclude a social plan. The Trade unions participate in all the decision-making processes with firms of more than fifteen workers before the restructuring takes place. Consequently, the power of the employer is scrutinised, especially in transfer and economic dismissals, by the trade union representatives within the firm (rappresentanze sindacali aziendali). In addition, if the procedural duties are breached, whether in case of economical dismissal the law provides for the abolition of the dismissal, in case of transfer of undertaking these Italian companies can be referred to the Italian labour courts by the trade unions for non-compliance with these formal arrangements (Article 28, Statuto dei lavoratori). If this negotiation fails the employer retains his power unlimited, except where established by law that is for example the respect of certain criteria for choosing the workers to be dismissed.
A good example of overcoming the legal guarantees in a more protective way towards the workers is offered by some collective agreements which broaden the notion of undertaking in order to lead a large number of hypothesis in the discipline of transfer of undertaking (i.e. the collective agreements in the banking sector).
The German entrepreneur is free to restructure in respect of a "social plan", under certain circumstances which can be imposed by the conciliation/arbitration committee where it mitigates or compensates for the consequences facing the workers. The German model of collective protection therefore illustrates that German entrepreneurs can carry out restructuring and it can only be prevented in limited circumstances.
Conclusions
Pour conclure sur ce dernier point, on voit que l’employeur anglais, libre apparemment, sera, semble t il, confronté à de nouveaux interlocuteurs. Entre droit substantiel et procédure, les systèmes juridiques semblent s’appuyer de plus en plus sur la participation des employés aux décisions de l’employeur. La procédure, à ce titre, offre un regard plus réaliste sur la situation du marché. Le bon employeur est celui dont les décisions sont discutées au sein d’une collectivité qui n’est cependant pas formée d’experts économiques.
C’est donc une approche sociale des relations entre le droit et le marché qui prévaudra dans la construction de la nouvelle figure de l’employeur.
Nous ne donnerons pas ici une définition substantielle des pouvoirs du nouvel employeur dans le cadre de restructuration de l’entreprise, mais nous nous attacherons à mettre en lumière les différents éléments pris en compte par nos systèmes dans la définition de l’employeur.
Il faut ici séparer deux groupes.
- Dans un premier groupe, unit par une approche économique prédominante, nous pouvons placer les systèmes britanniques et le systèmes français.
-Dans le deuxième groupe, liés par une approche substantielle du système légal, nous avons groupé les trois autres systèmes.
En effet, confronté aux problèmes économiques de restructuration et de transfert, le premier groupe (France et Grande Bretagne) utilisent une rationalité économique pour construire leur réponse légale, ce qui a pour conséquence de mettre en lumière l’utilité de la procédure en droit. Le juge anglais et français, a ainsi un rôle fondamental dans le contrôle des restructurations.
En revanche, le deuxième groupe confronté aux mêmes dysfonctionnements économiques apportent une réponse beaucoup plus substantielle et figée.
Contrairement aux systèmes français et britanniques, le deuxième groupe ne semblent pas accepter la rationalité économique en tant que telle. Ces systèmes montrent la nécessité, afin de recevoir les données économiques au sein du droit, de transformer d’abord les informations du marché en termes légaux et substantiels. C’est donc dans un deuxième temps seulement que les justifications économiques sont reçues par le droit et peuvent ainsi constituer un cas légal de restructuration.
Pour l’avenir, on pourrait en conclure que les systèmes anglais et français seront ouverts à une plus grande flexibilité alors que les systèmes italiens, allemands, et espagnol, seront toujours tournés vers un souci de rationalité sociale.
Mais cette conclusion est sans doute trop rapide. La véritable unité des systèmes européens reposent sur une problématique commune : réussir dans l’avenir à utiliser la rationalité économique à des fins de protection sociale.